Abstract
Introduction
Internet commerce has grown at a torrid pace over the last decade. The introduction of the Internet channel has caused profound changes in the ways of business, marketing channel structures, and relationships in many industries.
Armed with a mouse and a Web browser, both companies and consumers can now access almost unlimited choices of products and services, compare prices and features on a real-time basis, and execute transactions instantaneously. In many industries, this enhanced technology has helped to squeeze out inefficiencies, to lower prices, and in effect to level the playing field for medium and small businesses and individual consumers [6] .
One of the most frequently discussed effects of the emergence of the Internet channel has been disintermediation [20] . Disintermediation refers to the removal of organizations or business process layers responsible for certain intermediary steps in a given supply chain [18] . Many have speculated that disintermediation would be the most notable impact on marketing channels, believing that manufacturers would bypass existing independent physical retailers, reaching the ever-expanding market directly with greater market power and low costs [9] . Airlines, for example, are making tremendous headway selling tickets online, causing a deep fear among travel agents of "cutting out middlemen" [8] . Dell.com's direct selling structure using Internet channel is a well-known successful business case, which is a representative example of disintermediation. In contrast, a large group of manufacturers, including Robert Bosch, Maytag, Rubbermaid, and Liz Claiborne, hesitate to extend their distribution channel to the Internet because of potential channel conflict with their traditional retailers [9] . Channel conflict refers to any situation in which direct competition and/or damage caused by bypassing a former existing channel partner is perceived to have resulted from the introduction of a new, often online, channel [18] . When a firm adds a new direct online channel to the existing independent traditional retailer, it often faces a decision making problem of how much it should focus on its online channel. Despite the general interest in the issue, disintermediation has received surprisingly little attention in the analytic A Game Theoretic Modeling Analysis on the Internet Channel Disintermediation Weon Sang Yoo, Gyoo Gun Lim, Jonathan S. Kim modeling literature. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether manufacturers generally prefer disintermediation, as some fear.
In order to explore the above research question, we develop a game theoretic model that possesses three key characteristics. First, the main difference reflected in our model between an Internet store and a conventional brick-and-mortar store is not merely in shopping costs, convenience, operating costs, etc. [4, 12, 13, 16] , which can all be applied to the case of two competing brick-and-mortar stores. Instead, we build on the models developed by Balasubramanian [1] and Liu and Zhang [15] to explicitly capture the fact that an Internet channel and a physical store exist in two different dimensions (one in physical space and the other in cyber space) [1, 15] . This enables us to demonstrate that the effect of adding an Internet store is, indeed, different from that of adding another physical store. Second, our model reflects the fact that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for using a physical store and for using an Internet channel. This extends the models used by Balasubramanian [1] and Liu and Zhang [15] , which assume consumers are homogeneous in their preference for a direct/Internet channel. Furthermore, by assuming that consumer preference for an Internet channel is continuously distributed over a range, our model generalizes the assumption of two discrete consumer segments used by Kumar and Ruan (2006) and Ray et. al (2004) [1, 15, 13, 17] .
Third, while retaining the above two characteristics, our model captures the vertical strategic interactions between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, making it possible to analyze the channel structure issue discussed above. Although numerous previous models capture this vertical dimension of marketing channels, none simultaneously incorporate the three characteristics reflected in our model. This paper is organized as follows: After introducing the issues and related previous works about this topic in section 1, we will introduce our model in section 2. Then, section 3 shows the results of the analysis. After discussing the implications of this study in section 4, we will conclude this paper in section 5 with future research issues.
Model

Industry Structure and Rules of the Game
Our model consists of one manufacturer selling its product through one independent physical store, before an Internet store is introduced. After the manufacturer's direct Internet store is introduced to the market, the industry is comprised of one manufacturer and two types of distribution channels: a physical store and an Internet store. The physical store is an independent retailer, and the new Internet store is opened and operated by the manufacturer. If the manufacturer has an incentive to cannibalize the independent physical retailer, disintermediation would be observed. The channel structures analyzed and compared in this study are illustrated in Figure 1 . Although this model involves only one kind of product offered by the monopoly manufacturer, consumers view each productoutlet pair as a unique offering. Thus, the introduction of the Internet store gives rise to two product offerings.
We set up the Stackelberg game theory model for analysis, as typically assumed in previous analytical channel studies [4, 17] . This is essentially a two-stage model in which the manufacturer moves first (setting up its wholesale price). The retailer can then observe the manufacturer's output choice and choose its own optimal level of output (the retail price) [19] . When selling through an independent retailer (UD or PD in Figure 1 ), the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader maximizing its own profits with the foresight of the retailer's optimal responses. As the Stackelberg follower, the independent (or decentralized from the manufacturer) retailer maximizes its own profits, conditional on the wholesale price determined by the manufacturer. For simplicity, we set the marginal cost at zero, as typically done in this type of study.
Demand Model
We now introduce a spatial model that describes consumer heterogeneity and utility. Using this model, we derive the demand function for each product offering. The original demand model was developed by Yoo and Lee [21] . We adopt their model and modify it slightly for the purpose of this study.
Consumer Utility and Choice
We assume that a consumer purchases one unit of the product from the outlet that delivers highest positive utility when making a purchase decision. If none of the available product offerings provide positive utility, the consumer chooses to purchase nothing. We model consumer utility as a function of perceived value of the product (V), price (P), disutility related to using physical store j (δ Sij ), and disutility associated with the use of an Internet store (δ Ni ) as shown in Figure 2 . The Figure 1 Three Levels of Disintermediation disutility of using a physical store reflects not only travel cost but also the implicit costs of inconvenience, such as opportunity cost for time [1, 12] .
Note that we model the disutility of using the Internet as consumer specific (with the i subscript). Empirical studies have shown that levels of access to the Internet vary substantially across individuals depending upon race, gender, education, and age [10] . Li et al. (1999) also find that individual factors such as education, convenience orientation, experience orientation, channel knowledge, perceived distribution utility, and perceived accessibility are robust predictors of the extent to which an Internet user is a frequent online buyer [14] . Becker-Olsen (2000) reports a survey which suggests that the most important factors determining whether consumers buy online are their life style, propensity to adopt new innovations, and perception of the ease and convenience of using the Internet [2] .
Figure 2 Factors Influencing Consumer Utility
Nevertheless, previous studies [1, 15] capture the disutility of using the Internet with only common factors to all consumers, such as inconvenience of return and waiting for delivery, or the lack of fit of the product to an Internet transaction, and thereby failing to reflect varying degrees of preference for using the Internet among the consumers. In this paper, we capture not only the common factors considered in the literature, but also the consumer-specific factors including accessibility to the Internet, Internet literacy, propensity to adopt new technology and trend, and trust level towards online security, etc., by assuming consumer heterogeneity in terms of the disutility of using the Internet to purchase a product. The disutility of Internet use can be conceptualized as in Figure 3 Perhaps the simplest way to express this relationship is as follows:
Consumer i's utility of purchasing from the Internet store:
(1) Consumer i's utility of purchasing from physical store j:
The linear utility formulation and the choice rule assumed in this paper are consistent with previous studies [1, 3, 4, 12, 13, 17] . Demand functions are derived for equilibrium analysis by aggregating individual choices over the distribution of δ Sij and δ Ni . Figure 4 (a) illustrates our assumption concerning consumer heterogeneity. In the physical space, consumers are heterogeneous in their location, χ. As in typical linear city models, we assume χ is uniformly distributed over the horizontal line. Then, consumer i's disutility of using a physical store located at χ PS is defined as iPS S δ = |χ i -χ PS |. We also assume that consumers with the same physical location, χ (thus, the same level of disutility of using a particular physical store), are still heterogeneous in their disutility of using the Internet (δ N ), which is, once again, assumed to be uniformly distributed. This is consistent with Degeratu et al. (2000) , who argue that the disutility of using a physical store is different from that of using an Internet channel [7] .
Consumer Heterogeneity and Demand Derivation
This two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity leads to a uniform distribution of consumers over a rectangular range as depicted in Figure 4 (a) .
When there exists only one physical store in the market, it is easy to show that the best store location is the midpoint (i.e., χ PS =0 in Figure 4 (a) ). In this case, the symmetry of the original model in Figure 4 Without loss of generality, we assume the density of the market is 1. Thus, the demand for the physical store (Q S ) and the Internet store (Q N ) are
Result
The model described in the previous section is analyzed as a sequential game, in which the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader over an independent retailer as typically assumed in the channel modeling literature. We obtained the equilibrium solutions using the standard approach of first identifying the retailer's best response (retail price) to a given manufacturer's wholesale price for the retailer, and then solving backward the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price with the foresight.
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Weighted by demands
This "reverse-solving" approach assures a sub-game perfect equilibrium. Table 1 summarizes closed-form solutions for the three channel structures shown above.
When the manufacturer with the independent physical store (UD) opens its own Internet store (PD), the channel becomes to be partially disintermediated. Under this channel structure the manufacturer still sells its products through the independent physical retailer while it begins to sell its products directly to the customers through its own Internet channel. This structural change causes decreases in retail prices and demand, and thus, in profits for the independent physical store (See Avg. Retail Price, Q N , and Q S in Table 1 ).
The wholesale price (W) in the partially disintermediated channel increases slightly, and the price offered by the Internet store is low (See W and P N in Table 1 ). The total demand and the manufacturer's profit increase by more than 100% with the new Internet store (See Total Q and Total M profit in Table  1 ). The manufacturer's profit from the Internet store is about three times that from the physical store (See M Profit w/ N and M Profit w/ PS in Table 1 ). From the independent retailer's point of view, the Internet store introduced by a manufacturer is a serious threat, because the manufacturer's direct channel has a cost advantage over the independent physical store. Moreover, the manufacturer could strategically use its direct Internet channel for price discrimination. In addition, the introduction of an Internet store improves consumer surplus due to wider market coverage for heterogeneous customers (See Consumer Surplus in Table 1 ).
As illustrated in Figure 1 , a manufacturer intending disintermediation first introduces its direct Internet store (PD), and then eliminates the independent physical retailer completely by charging a high wholesale price (FD). Now, let's compare the manufacturer's profit between PD and FD to see whether the manufacturer has an incentive to cannibalize the independent retailer (See Total M Profit in Table 1 ). The results show that the manufacturer makes a higher profit in the partially disintermediated channel (PD) than in the fully disintermediated channel (FD).
Conclusion
This paper investigates whether the Internet channel would lead to disintermediation. To examine this issue, we developed a game theoretic model capturing fundamental differences between the two channel types and heterogeneous consumer preference for each channel. The results show that the introduction of an Internet store by the manufacturer is a serious threat to the independent physical retailer. However, we find that the manufacturer prefers to keep the physical store, rather than eliminating it completely by charging very high wholesale prices. The intuition behind this finding is the manufacturer wants to cover wider variety of consumers with both types of channels. In addition, the manufacturer can strategically use both types of channels for price discrimination.
For online channel managers, the results of this study indicate that facing new competition from an Internet channel would be a serious threat to the existing physical store retailer. However, manufacturers should be aware that "going direct" to the customers by cutting the middlemen completely for higher margin and greater control would be worse off in terms of profitability due to limited market coverage.
For economic modelers, this study introduces a new approach to modeling the physical store channel and the Internet channel. By explicitly capturing the fact that the Internet channel does not exist in the physical location dimension as physical stores do, this model could provide realistic results about disintermediation. This was made possible by modeling consumers' disutility of using the Internet as independent of spatial location, as assumed by Balasubramanian [1] , and as heterogeneous across consumers, thereby extending his model.
We acknowledge limitations of our study. First, our base model of a monopolist manufacturer and a monopolist retailer doesn't allow for competition before the Internet channel introduction. Further research is needed to examine how well our results generalize to markets with competition at the manufacturer and/or the retailer level. In particular, it will be interesting to see how the degree of competition affects the effects of disintermediation. Second, as in most previous analytical channel studies, we do not consider any variable or fixed costs for any channel members in order to focus our attention on the demand side environment and its impact on strategic interactions in the channel members' pricing decisions. Real world applications of our results will require considering those factors that were not included in the model. Third, our model views consumer channel choice as an "either or" decision, and, consequently, ignores the real possibility that consumers might take advantage of both as complementing each other (e.g., a physical product examination in the physical store followed by a purchase through the Internet). These factors must be considered before applying our findings to channel structure decisions. Finally, although our model distinguishes the Internet as a different type of channel from physical stores, it doesn't capture any unique characteristics of the Internet in comparison to other non-store retailing channels such as catalog retailers and TV home shopping channels. This is also true for previous studies on the Internet channel [1, 5, 13, 15, 16] . Developing a model that captures key differences across these different types of channels will be another significant future research direction toward better understanding of the inter-channel coordination problem.
